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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1998, Ray Donald Loy was convicted of receiving and possessing 
child pornography. 1  After Loy had served thirty-three months in prison, the 
district court placed him on supervised release, subject to certain conditions, 
                                                 
 * 2010 graduate, the University of Chicago Law School; 2011 Legal Fellow, The Student Press Law 
Center.  The author would like to thank Gregory Coordes and Karen Bradshaw Schulz for their assistance 
with this article. 
 1. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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including a condition that prohibited Loy from possessing “pornography.” 2  
Loy challenged this condition in court, claiming both that he did not 
understand the meaning of the word “pornography” and that the condition 
prohibited both adult pornography, to which Loy claimed a First Amendment 
right of access, and illegal child pornography.3  In essence, Loy argued that 
the condition was both vague and overbroad.  In response, the government 
argued that Loy’s probation officer could help him determine the meaning of 
the term “pornography” as it applied to his release condition.4  The 
government also asserted that the special release condition would serve to 
deter any future misbehavior by Loy as well as serve the goals of 
rehabilitating him and protecting the public.5  Faced with these arguments, 
the Third Circuit reviewed the sentencing court’s decision to impose 
conditions of supervised release to determine whether the release condition 
was in fact unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.6 
Loy’s case has become an all too common scenario in the circuit courts, 
as defendants repeatedly challenge similar special release conditions across 
the country.  As circuit courts have attempted to determine what exactly 
makes a special release condition vague or overbroad, a split has arisen over 
their interpretation of release conditions concerning pornography or sexually 
stimulating materials. 
Determinations about special release conditions and probationers’ rights 
have the potential to make a wide-ranging impact.  According to the United 
States Department of Justice, as of 2010, approximately 4.9 million adults 
were on supervised release and about four million adults were on probation.7  
In 2004, the average length of a probation sentence for a person convicted of 
a felony offense was three years and two months.8  Thus, probationers on 
supervised release make up a fairly significant group of individuals who, for 
a significant period of their lives, must live with unique rights and 
restrictions. 
When evaluating special release conditions, courts have accepted that 
probationers in some circumstances may be prohibited from accessing 
sexually oriented materials as a condition of their probation.9  Even though 
many sexually oriented materials are ordinarily protected by the First 
Amendment, the constitutional rights of probationers may sometimes be 
                                                 
 2. Id. at 253. 
 3. Id. at 253, 262. 
 4. Id. at 255–56. 
 5. See id. at 255, 266. 
 6. Id. at 256. 
 7. Thomas P. Bonczar & Lauren E. Glaze, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2010, BUREAU 
OF JUST. STATS., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2239 (last updated Nov. 21, 2011). 
 8. Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2004, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/fssc04.txt (last updated July 10, 2007). 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding condition of supervised 
release prohibiting probationer from possessing sexually stimulating materials). 
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restricted to further legitimate state interests.10  Even assuming that such 
restrictions are constitutional in the context of probationers, however, 
defining the category of materials subject to these restrictions in order to 
meet constitutional standards is often problematic.   
This article examines the design of special release conditions and the 
problems that arise when such conditions do not comport with constitutional 
standards.  Part I provides a general overview of the First Amendment issues 
that often arise with respect to special release conditions.  Part II discusses 
the current state of the law and classifies the types of bans defendants have 
encountered in supervised release conditions.  Part III explains the factors 
that are frequently considered in assessing the validity of special release 
conditions, and Part IV suggests a new approach for evaluating the 
constitutionality of special release conditions.  The article concludes by 
endorsing constitutionally permissible tailoring for release conditions and by 
encouraging courts to interpret these conditions with careful attention to the 
individual defendant’s situation. 
 
II.   BACKGROUND 
 
A. First Amendment Doctrine 
 
Although probationers’ First Amendment rights may constitutionally be 
limited, probationers cannot be precluded from exercising their First 
Amendment rights unless certain standards are met.  Certain speech, such as 
obscenity, receives no First Amendment protection and can therefore be 
prohibited outright for everyone under the law. 11  Yet, obscenity 
encompasses only a very narrow category of speech—that which has no 
societal value.12  Other forms of speech, including pornography and forms of 
sexually oriented expression, do receive First Amendment protection and 
therefore raise vagueness and overbreadth issues when they are prohibited in 
special release conditions. 
Over the years, courts have imposed many restraints on speech.  For 
example, courts have expanded the obscenity doctrine to include expression 
that is “obscene for children.”13  The Supreme Court has also held that 
zoning ordinances differentiating between movie theatres that show sexually 
                                                 
 10. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 & n. 14 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that 
“probationers, like parolees and prisoners, properly are subject to limitations from which ordinary persons 
are free” and “[m]erely because a convicted individual’s fundamental rights are involved should not make 
a probation condition . . . automatically suspect”). 
 11. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating 
expression is obscene for children if it meets the criteria for obscenity as set forth in Miller v. California, 
414 U.S. 881 (1973), when examined from a minor’s point of view). 
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explicit material and those that do not violate neither the First Amendment 
nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 
The subject matter this article explores is different from obscenity, child 
pornography, and the other examples of regulated speech given above, in that 
when a special release condition seeks to constrain “pornography” or 
“sexually oriented” materials, it is regulating a form of expression that is 
otherwise protected by the First Amendment.  Courts have repeatedly 
acknowledged that the First Amendment protects these materials, particularly 
when they can be shown to have some kind of artistic value.15  Indeed, at 
least one court has explicitly stated that pornography that is not obscene and 
that is in the hands of an ordinary adult receives full First Amendment 
protection.16  Thus, in every case involving special release conditions and 
pornography, courts must evaluate the state’s interest in restricting otherwise 
protected speech. 
Over the years, a principle has emerged that, in appropriate 
circumstances, the state may prohibit probationers from having access to 
certain protected materials if the prohibition can be shown to serve the ends 
of the probation.17  For example, people who have been convicted of an 
offense related to a political protest may be subject to a special release 
condition prohibiting them from participating in political demonstrations.18  
Although the right to demonstrate is a form of protected political expression, 
courts will uphold the denial of this right to probationers if the government 
can demonstrate that the restriction helps prevent public disorder and 
rehabilitates the defendant.19  In the case of sexually oriented expression, 
courts have held that free speech rights may be restricted in order to address 
a defendant’s “sexual deviance problem.”20   
But when exactly can a defendant be said to have a “sexual deviance 
problem” sufficient to warrant a denial of access to constitutionally protected 
materials?  Courts have struggled to answer this question for years, and no 
clear set of guidelines has emerged.  In general, when a statute, ordinance, or 
release condition restricts expressive activity that is typically protected by the 
First Amendment (such as pornography), plaintiffs argue that the restriction 
is overbroad because “it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount 
                                                 
 14. See generally Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 69–70, 72–73 (1976). 
 15. See id. at 70. 
 16. Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 497 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 17. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265 (holding that probationers, parolees, and prisoners can be 
subject to limitations from which ordinary people are free as long as the limitations serve the ends of 
probation); see also id. at 497 (“Pornographic materials—at least those that are not obscene—receive full 
First Amendment protection when in the possession of ordinary adults, but may be regulated in the hands 
of parolees to a much greater extent.”). 
 18. Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 203 (1967). 
 19. Id. 
 20. United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 619 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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of protected speech.”21  In each relevant case, the ultimate determination of 
overbreadth has depended, at least in part, on the individual’s prior behavior, 
current situation, and suspected future tendencies.22  If a special release 
condition can be shown to serve the goals of preventing recidivism and 
protecting the public from harm, it can pass the overbreadth test; if not, the 
special release condition may be considered overbroad because it infringes 
on First Amendment rights without providing benefit to society and the 
probationer.23 
 
B. Vagueness Doctrine 
 
In addition to addressing whether a special release condition goes too far, 
courts evaluating the constitutionality of special release conditions must 
consider whether the release conditions are too vague.  Vagueness doctrine 
originates from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.24  The 
Supreme Court has held that a statute or ordinance does not comport with 
due process if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice 
of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”25   
 “First Amendment vagueness” occurs when a vague condition restricts 
First Amendment-protected activity.  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
laws must serve at least two purposes to avoid being void for vagueness.  
First, they must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the kind 
of conduct that is prohibited.26  Second, laws must not allow for enforcement 
that is arbitrary or discriminatory.27  The Supreme Court has endorsed a 
standard for evaluating vague laws: a statute or condition may not forbid or 
require conduct “in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning.”28  With this definition, the Court has 
implicitly embraced a type of “reasonable person” standard that has been 
used to evaluate vagueness since 1926.   
                                                 
 21. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304; see also Loy, 237 F.3d at 259 n.2 (“When a statute is vague and 
arguably involves protected conduct, vagueness analysis will necessarily intertwine with overbreadth 
analysis.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Loy, 237 F.3d at 264 (observing that a probation condition must be directly related to the 
goal of promoting Loy’s rehabilitation); United States v. Perazza-Mercadom 553 F.3d 65, 70–71 (1st Cir. 
2009) (noting that courts have upheld supervised release conditions based on the defendant’s underlying 
offense, the defendant’s history, and the defendant’s particular characteristics). 
 23. See, e.g., Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d at 70–71 (summarizing case law discussing when a special 
release condition may be upheld and noting that “the ultimate purpose of supervised release is . . . the 
offender’s return to society”). 
 24. Williams, 553 U.S. at 304. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). 
 27. See id.; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (holding that an enactment 
may be impermissibly vague if it does not establish standards for the police and the public that sufficiently 
guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty). 
 28. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
74 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 11, No. 1 
As several leading court cases have indicated, vague laws raise enormous 
issues, particularly in the criminal law context.  First, vague laws can have 
the effect of criminalizing activity that is normally innocent.29  Additionally, 
unclear laws can threaten liberty, freedom and independence, as everyone is 
entitled to know what conduct is prohibited and what is not.30  Vague laws 
further complicate the law by incentivizing inefficient conduct: people must 
rearrange their behavior so as to steer clear of a wide range of actions—some 
innocent and some not—that might trigger the vague law, while law 
enforcement officials must take more steps to punish conduct they might not 
be punishing were the law otherwise clear.31  Finally, vague laws can and do 
result in discretionary and even discriminatory enforcement.32  In other 
words, vague laws may give enforcement officials the power to prohibit 
behavior, not because it is illegal, but because the enforcing official simply 
does not like it. 
As an example of the problems associated with vagueness, consider the 
term “pornography.”  No legal standard currently exists to clarify the word 
“pornography.”  As a result, “pornography” could be interpreted to 
encompass only those materials that depict or describe sexual conduct.  
Alternatively, the term could be read more broadly so as to encompass all 
material featuring nudity, including works of art such as Michelangelo’s 
David sculpture or Eduard Manet’s famous painting, Le Dejeuner sur 
L’Herbe.  If release conditions using the word “pornography” are interpreted 
expansively, they run the risk of criminalizing speech that may be beneficial 
to the probationer.  As discussed throughout this article, it is often difficult 
for people—both those subject to the conditions as well as those enforcing 
them—to understand the limitations of the term and therefore to know what 
materials fall under the scope of the condition.  Furthermore, courts faced 
with discriminatory enforcement claims have struggled to find an acceptable 
definition for the term so that they can give clearer guidance to enforcement 
officials. 
To overcome a vagueness challenge, a law must “provide explicit 
standards for those who apply [it].”33  Vague laws that implicate First 
Amendment rights receive special treatment: as one court has noted, “a 
stricter standard of definiteness applies if material protected by the First 
                                                 
 29. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163. 
 30. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning.”); see Papachristou, 405 at 164; see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 
453 (1939) (“No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”). 
 31. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09 (“Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of 
the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”). 
 32. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (striking down an ordinance as impermissibly vague because the 
ordinance lacked standards to govern the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials and thus 
encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law). 
 33. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. 
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Amendment falls within the prohibition.”34  Thus, when looking at special 
release conditions, vagueness and First Amendment law seem to operate in 
connection with each other: the more the condition infringes on a defendant’s 
First Amendment rights, the clearer the prohibition needs to be.35  Yet, if the 
defendant’s First Amendment rights are limited as a consequence of the 
defendant’s individual circumstances, some vagueness may be acceptable in 
the prohibition.36   
As an example of how vagueness doctrine operates in relation to the 
exercise of constitutional rights, consider the case of a defendant convicted 
of possession of child pornography.  While it is clear that the government 
may prohibit this defendant from possessing child pornography again, courts 
have also upheld government restrictions prohibiting such defendants from 
going to areas that children are likely to frequent.37  Even though the 
defendant may argue that this restriction is too vague and that places children 
are likely to frequent may not be clear, this defendant may nevertheless be 
thus restricted if the government can show that the imposition of this 
restriction will adequately meet the goals of curbing the defendant’s desire 
for child pornography, protecting children from harm, and/or rehabilitating 
the defendant.38  In this way, the restriction can be upheld even though it may 
not be exactly clear as to where the defendant can and cannot go. 
Finally, vagueness doctrine typically applies to statutes and ordinances; 
however, most courts apply the same doctrine to release conditions with one 
procedural distinction.39  Because special release conditions are not enacted 
by a legislature, but are rather imposed by the sentencing courts themselves, 
they do not have the presumption of validity that would otherwise be 
accorded to statutes and ordinances facing a vagueness challenge.40  
Therefore, the probationer arguably has a lower burden of establishing that 
the conditions are unconstitutional, and these conditions may be overturned if 
                                                 
 34. State v. Bahl, 193 P.3d 678, 685 (Wash. 2008). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Kenrick, 241 F. App’x 10, 17 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that even if a 
condition has a rehabilitative, deterrent, or penological purpose, it must be balanced against First 
Amendment concerns); Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (noting that in the First Amendment context, a plaintiff 
may argue that a statute is overbroad because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of 
protected speech).  
 36. See, e.g., Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 497 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that because the special 
release condition at issue applied to someone with limited First Amendment rights regarding access to 
sexual materials, there was no threat to chilling constitutionally protected conduct such that a vagueness 
challenge might be sustained). 
 37. See, e.g., Bee, 162 F.3d at 1235–36 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that restriction prohibiting defendant 
from loitering within 100 feet of places primarily used by children was not unconstitutionally vague 
because the limitation would effectively address defendant Bee’s problem and because it would be 
reasonable for Bee to avoid places that would be unacceptable). 
 38. See id. at 1236 (“In a case such as this, even very broad conditions are reasonable if they are 
intended to promote the probationer’s rehabilitation and to protect the public.”). 
 39. Bahl, 193 P.3d at 686. 
 40. Id. 
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a reviewing court finds that they are patently unreasonable.41   
 
C. Prisoners, Probationers, and Special Release Conditions 
 
A brief examination of the constitutional limitations for prisoners will 
help put the situation for probationers into context.  Although prisoners do 
not have the full constitutional rights enjoyed by ordinary people, they do 
receive some First Amendment protection.42  This protection is subject to 
limitations, and the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”43  These “interests” 
include deterrence, prisoner rehabilitation, and institutional security.44  Prison 
administrators are also given great deference in their enforcement of these 
regulations, so the amount of First Amendment protection a prisoner receives 
may well depend on the individual situation.45  The Court has identified 
several factors that could lead to the conclusion that a given prison regulation 
is “reasonably related” to legitimate interests, including whether the 
regulation has “a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests 
invoked to justify it[,]” whether other ways of exercising the right are 
available to inmates, and the impact that accommodation of the right would 
have on other inmates, prison officials, and on prison resources.46 
For example, in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,47 Islamic prison inmates 
claimed that two policies adopted by officials in their New Jersey prison 
prevented them from attending a Muslim service on Friday afternoons.48  The 
first policy mandated that the inmates work outside of the building in which 
the service was held, and the second policy prohibited the inmates from 
going into that building during the day.49  The inmates claimed that these 
regulations interfered with their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.50  The Supreme Court held that, based on findings at the 
district court level, the policies were reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests and therefore were consistent with the prisoners’ rights 
under the First Amendment.51  The Court reasoned that the policies were 
related to government interests in institutional order and security and that 
                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). 
 43. Id. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 
 44. Id. at 348. 
 45. Id. at 349. 
 46. Id. at 350–52. 
 47. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
 48. Id. at 345. 
 49. Id. at 345–47. 
 50. Id. at 347. 
 51. Id. at 350. 
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they did not prohibit the inmates from attending all Muslim services.52  
Finally, the Court held that alternatives to the policies would have adverse 
effects on the prison institution.53 
With respect to constitutional rights, probationers fall somewhere 
between prisoners and citizens who have full access to their rights.  The 
question of where exactly probationers’ rights fit in on the spectrum is one of 
the central legal issues courts struggle with today.  Compared with prisoners, 
there are fewer cases involving restrictions on probationers’ constitutional 
rights; however, certain guidelines do exist for imposing special release 
conditions on probationers.   
After a defendant completes his prison sentence, he may be subject to 
several months or years of supervised release.  During this time, he must 
comply with certain conditions, and one or more probation officers are 
assigned to him to ensure his compliance.  In general, the sentencing court 
delineates special release conditions for the probationers to follow and is 
given broad discretion to do so, even if those conditions limit the exercise of 
the probationer’s fundamental rights.54  The court may impose whatever 
“conditions of supervised release it considers appropriate”; however, 
restrictions on probationers’ constitutional rights will generally be regarded 
more favorably if it is clear that the conditions are reasonably related to the 
offense, do not deprive the defendant of any more liberty than is reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances, and are consistent with any relevant 
policy statements the Sentencing Commission might have issued.55  The 
Sentencing Guidelines provide several different types of conditions that 
might be appropriate in particular cases; however, courts are free to deviate 
from the provided conditions if they so choose.56  As a result of the leeway 
given to courts, supervised release conditions can take many forms.   
 
III.  THE CURRENT LAW  
 
A. Types of Bans 
 
As mentioned in Part I, not all conditions of supervised release are alike; 
however, this article focuses on defendants who challenge release conditions 
that fall into two broad categories: bans on “pornography,” and/or bans on 
material that is “sexually stimulating” or “sexually oriented.” The following 
is a brief overview of these types of bans. 
Sometimes, a supervised release condition will simply ban a defendant’s 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 351–52. 
 53. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352–53. 
 54. 9B Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 22:2012 (2008). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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access to or possession of “pornography” without further explanation or 
clarification.  In these cases, courts must examine whether the term 
“pornography” itself is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad or whether, in 
their view, the release condition gives fair notice to defendants on special 
release and is reasonably related to the goals of the state.57  In general, most 
courts faced with a ban containing the word “pornography” have held that 
the term as used in release conditions is impermissibly vague and have struck 
down the release condition as unconstitutional.58 
Defendants have also brought challenges to release conditions that do not 
mention “pornography” explicitly, but instead ban material of a “sexually 
stimulating” nature.  Courts facing challenges to these bans have typically 
upheld the conditions as constitutional while differentiating them from 
blanket prohibitions on “pornography.”59  Although the government’s 
arguments typically remain the same in both types of cases, courts have 
generally found bans on “sexually stimulating” materials to be more 
acceptable than bans on “pornography.” 
Of course, some special release conditions include bans on both 
“pornography” and material of a “sexually stimulating” nature.  The case law 
here contains mixed holdings, illustrating that the wording of the release 
condition itself often does not make a difference when dealing with these 
                                                 
 57. See, e.g., Farrell, 449 F.3d at 486–92 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing the term “pornography” and 
noting the confusion generated by the term). 
 58. Compare Farrell, 449 F.3d at 489 (finding that condition fails to give proper notice or contain 
discretion), and United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
“pornography” is inherently vague and condition leaves too much discretion to probation officer), and 
Loy, 237 F.3d at 265 (holding that condition conflicts with due process values and threatens to chill 
protected conduct), with United States v. Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x 750, 753–54 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding the special release conditions at issue), and United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 694–95 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (upholding restriction as tailored to the goals of promoting rehabilitation and protecting 
children).  It is noteworthy that in both Wilkinson and Ristine, the defendant did not raise the vagueness 
issue at trial, and the appeals court in each case was forced to evaluate the challenge using a clear error 
standard of review.  Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x at 753–54; Ristine, 335 F.3d at 694.  Both courts noted that 
while the condition might not be upheld on a stricter standard of review, because the law was so unclear in 
this area, the court could not strike down the prohibition under this very deferential standard of review. 
Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x at 754; Ristine, 335 F.3d at 695.    
 59. Compare United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 193 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding a condition 
prohibiting possession of “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials”), and Bee, 162 F.3d at 1235 
(upholding a condition prohibiting possession of “sexually stimulating or sexually oriented material” 
because purpose of limitation was primarily to rehabilitate the probationer and protect the public), with 
United States v. Kenrick, 241 F. App’x 10, 17 (3d Cir. 2007) (striking down a condition prohibiting 
“sexually explicit conduct”).  Kenrick is arguably distinguishable from Bee and Phipps, however, in that a 
ban on conduct is different from a ban on possession.  While the case in Kenrick largely revolved around 
First Amendment issues, the Third Circuit noted that the phrase “sexually explicit conduct” might actually 
be broader than “pornography.”  Kenrick, 241 F. App’x at 16–17.  In spite of this finding, the court upheld 
the release condition on First Amendment grounds, suggesting that the more the government can show 
that a condition is closely related to the goals of deterrence, public protection, and defendant 
rehabilitation, the less stringent the court will be in requiring the condition to be clear on its face.  Id. at 
17, 20.  It is noteworthy that this same court, only eight years earlier, had issued a strong prohibition 
against using vague language in special release conditions in Loy, suggesting that the First Amendment 
and due process requirements operate on a sort of sliding scale.  Loy, 237 F.3d at 264. 
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types of release conditions.60 
 
B. Case Law 
 
The circuit courts are divided on the question of whether or not using 
words such as “pornography” or “sexually stimulating” to describe 
prohibited material is unconstitutionally vague.  This Section provides an 
overview of the current state of the law and a look at the circuit split.  
Notably, the Eighth, Eleventh, Fifth, Second and Ninth Circuits have all 
upheld challenged conditions, while the First, Third, and Ninth61 Circuits 
have struck down similar conditions as unconstitutional. 
 
1. Cases where release provisions have been upheld as constitutional. 
 
In general, courts that have upheld special release conditions containing 
the words “pornography” or “sexually oriented materials” have done so when 
they believe that the conditions, though vague, are nevertheless reasonably 
related to the goals proffered by the state in relation to the defendant.62  For 
example, in United States v. Boston,63 the Eighth Circuit upheld a special 
release condition that prohibited defendant Boston from possessing “any 
form of pornography, sexually stimulating or sexually oriented material” in 
spite of Boston’s argument that he only had a sexual offense history with 
minors.64  Despite the apparent breadth of the condition, the court accepted 
the government’s argument that the terms of the prohibition were 
“reasonable and rationally related” to the twin goals of deterring Boston from 
                                                 
 60. Compare United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667–68 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding the special 
release condition prohibiting “any form of pornography, sexually stimulating, or sexually oriented 
material”), with United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005) (following Guagliardo, 
278 F.3d at 868, and striking down the special release condition prohibiting “any pornographic, sexually 
oriented or sexually stimulating materials”). 
 61. While the Ninth Circuit still contains precedent upholding a release condition prohibiting “sexually 
stimulating” materials, its most recent decisions have struck down release provisions on both 
“pornography” and “sexually stimulating” materials as unconstitutional.  Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1142; Bee, 
162 F.3d at 1236.  
 62. E.g., Bee, 162 F.3d at 1235 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that condition challenged for vagueness could 
be upheld because the state had shown that it would effectively rehabilitate Bee and was an appropriate 
reflection of the seriousness of Bee’s offense).  Although the Ninth Circuit later declined to follow Bee in 
Antelope, Bee has nevertheless been cited as valid precedent in at least one recent case.  Wilkinson, 282 F. 
App’x at 754.  For other examples of courts that have upheld special release conditions of the type 
considered here, e.g. Ristine, 335 F.3d at 694–95 (upholding a condition prohibiting “pornography” 
because it was tailored to the goals of rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the public and because, 
on plain error review, the law on vagueness was so unsettled that the court could not find clear error); 
Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x at 754–55 (upholding release condition prohibiting “pornography” because the 
defendant could not convincingly show that the lower court had committed plain error in light of unsettled 
vagueness law). 
 63. 494 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 64. Id. at 667–68. 
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committing the offense again and rehabilitating him.65  The court reasoned 
that, given Boston’s history66 and the government’s desire to deter future 
unlawful conduct on Boston’s part, the condition was reasonably related to 
the goal of addressing his problem and could be upheld in spite of Boston’s 
contention that the conditions were overbroad.67 
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach in United States v. Phipps68 
when it upheld a ban on possession of “sexually oriented or sexually 
stimulating materials.”69  The court acknowledged that the language in the 
prohibition could be considered vague; however, it held that the prohibition 
was not vague when read in a “commonsense” way.70  The Phipps court 
understood “commonsense” to mean reading the condition in connection 
with the other conditions of supervised release.71  By looking at all of the 
conditions as a coherent scheme, the court reasoned, it could better 
understand how each individual condition was meant to be applied to the 
defendant.72  The Fifth Circuit proceeded to read the prohibition at issue in 
conjunction with another condition prohibiting the defendant from 
patronizing sexually oriented establishments, which the court determined 
were “places such as strip clubs and adult theaters or bookstores.”73  The 
court decided that the ban on “sexually oriented or sexually stimulating 
materials” was limited in practice to the kinds of sexually oriented materials 
commonly available at those establishments.74  By reading the special release 
conditions together, the court was able to narrow and clarify the condition 
being challenged for vagueness. 
In general, when courts uphold special release conditions, they tend to do 
so because the government can demonstrate that the conditions are 
reasonably related to its goals of deterrence and public protection.  In this 
way, the condition can usually withstand challenges of being overbroad 
because the government has a legitimate interest in regulating a particular 
individual’s conduct.  Similarly, the government is more likely to survive a 
vagueness challenge because some vagueness is more likely to be acceptable 
once the government proves a legitimate interest.  When courts determine 
that these types of prohibitions sufficiently relate to the government’s goals, 
they uphold the conditions even though the conditions may nevertheless 
                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. Defendant Boston had a history of producing and receiving child pornography.  Id. at 663–64. 
 67. Id. at 665, 668. 
 68. 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 69. Id. at 192–93.  It is noteworthy that the supervised release condition in the Phipps case, like the 
conditions in Ristine and Wilkinson, also came up on plain error review; however, in Phipps, the Fifth 
Circuit gave more attention to the condition.  Compare Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x at 753–55, and Ristine, 
335 F.3d at 694–97, with Phipps, 319 F.3d at 181, 192–94.  
 70. Phipps, 319 F.3d at 193. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Phipps, 319 F.3d at 193. 
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contain vague language.   
 
2. Cases where release provisions have been struck down as 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 
In cases where courts strike down special release conditions, it appears 
that the court—when weighing the vagueness of each condition against the 
government’s stated goals for the public and the defendant—finds that the 
vagueness of the condition’s language outweighs any legitimate interests the 
government may have in imposing the condition.  For example, in United 
States v Loy,75 defendant Loy challenged a release condition that prohibited 
him from possessing “all forms of pornography, including legal adult 
pornography” on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad.76  The 
government argued that the supervised release condition was similar to 
regulations the defendant might face were he in prison.77 Because 
pornography was prohibited in prison regulations, the government reasoned 
that it was equally acceptable to put a blanket ban on pornography while the 
defendant was on supervised release.78  The government also contended that, 
should Loy be unclear of the scope of the term “pornography,” he could ask 
his probation officer to clarify.79  Finally, the government maintained that the 
condition was not overbroad because Loy’s constitutional rights were more 
limited than others based on his prior conduct, and therefore no “protected 
conduct” could be chilled in the context of Loy’s supervised release.80 
In spite of the government’s arguments, the Third Circuit struck down 
the ban.81  The court first explained that Miller v California82 applied to this 
case, stating that the term “pornography” was broader than the term 
“obscenity” as defined in Miller.83  Specifically, the court noted that 
“pornography” could encompass many things that were not patently 
offensive or even obscene, such as Michelangelo’s David sculpture.84  Next, 
the court rejected the government’s argument that we “know [pornography] 
when we see it;” it held that the special release conditions conflicted with due 
process, threatened to chill protected conduct, and could give probation 
officers too much discretion in enforcement.85  The court noted that probation 
officers are no more qualified than the public to know pornography when 
                                                 
 75. 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 76. Loy, 237 F.3d at 253, 261. 
 77. Id. at 264 n. 5.   
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 266. 
 80. Loy, 237 F.3d at 259–60. 
 81. Id. at 270. 
 82. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing the test for determining whether material was “obscene”). 
 83. Loy, 237 F.3d at 262–63. 
 84. Id. at 264. 
 85. Id. at 264–65. 
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they see it.86   
Although the court in Loy struck down the prohibition, it narrowed its 
holding, stating that it only applied to extreme cases where the ban in 
question could arguably apply to any art form that employs nudity.87  The 
court noted that such broad bans could not possibly serve the goals of public 
protection and defendant rehabilitation when they were so all-
encompassing.88   
The government unsuccessfully employed similar arguments in United 
States v. Guagliardo.89  In that case, defendant Guagliardo challenged both 
his conviction for possessing child pornography as well as his conditions of 
supervised release.90  The relevant prohibition at issue was again a blanket 
ban on “any pornography.”91 The government again argued that the 
prohibition was not vague because the defendant’s probation officer had the 
authority to interpret the release provision and could consequently clarify it 
for the defendant.92  The Ninth Circuit nevertheless struck down the 
prohibition, holding that it was impermissibly vague since the definition of 
pornography was “entirely subjective.”93  In its opinion, the court expressed 
concern that pornography could acquire a dangerous “after-the-fact” 
definition, where the limitations of the term would be understood only after 
the defendant was accused of violating the condition.94  The court held that 
such an “after-the-fact” definition was unconstitutional, and that the 
prohibition gave the probation officer too much discretion.95  
In Farrell v Burke,96 the defendant, after being accused of violating a 
probation condition banning “pornographic material,” challenged the ban.  
He argued that he could not understand the meaning of “pornographic,” and 
supported his contention with evidence that the government itself could not 
come up with a meaning for the term that was acceptable to all parties 
involved.97  For its part, the government conceded that the restriction was 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 266. 
 87. Id.  Despite the language the court used to narrow its holding, Loy has nevertheless been cited by 
other cases as an example of a case that definitively struck down bans on pornography in special release 
conditions.  See, e.g., Phipps, 319 F.3d at 193 (noting that the Loy court reasoned that the category of 
“pornography” is too broad to give a probationer adequate notice of what he may and may not possess 
while on probation). 
 88. Loy, 237 F.3d at 266. 
 89. 278 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 90. Id. at 870. 
 91. Id. at 872. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 872. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 97. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 482.  Farrell was arrested for possessing “pornographic material” after parole 
officers searched his home, and found two publications in his possession that they claimed were 
“pornographic”: Scum: True Homosexual Experiences, and the magazine, My Comrade, featuring an 
article on gay sex.  Id. at 477.  In reviewing the publications, the court found that Scum’s graphic 
descriptions of sex between young boys were more prurient in nature than My Comrade, which was meant 
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unclear, yet argued that it should nevertheless be upheld because it was 
reasonably related to the state’s goal of rehabilitating Farrell.98  In response, 
the Second Circuit stated that “pornography” would always carry a 
presumption of inherent vagueness when it was used in release conditions.99  
In its decision, the court adopted a two-part test for evaluating the vagueness 
of special release conditions.100  First, the court asked whether the condition 
or statute gave adequate notice to the concerned parties.101  The court next 
evaluated whether the statute or condition created a threat of arbitrary or 
discriminatory enforcement.102  The court expressed its hope that a clear and 
workable definition for the word “pornography” could someday be 
developed and used in special release conditions.103  Notably, the court 
rejected Farrell’s overbreadth challenges, holding that Farrell’s First 
Amendment rights were limited because he was a paroled sex offender, and, 
therefore, it was unlikely that the condition chilled any protected conduct as 
applied to him.104  
In recent years, several other circuits have struck down release 
conditions prohibiting “pornography” or similar terms.105  Recently, in State 
v Bahl, the Washington Supreme Court struck down a ban on “pornographic 
materials.”106  After Bahl submitted a vagueness challenge, the court held 
that despite the fact that “pornography” was defined in a state statute, the 
ordinary meaning of “pornography” still could not be determined from the 
statutory definition.107  Although the court held that prohibitions must be 
considered “in the context in which they are used,” it rejected the 
government’s argument that the condition could readily be interpreted by 
Bahl’s probation officer.108  Instead, the court found that the government’s 
reliance on the probation officer’s interpretation was itself evidence of the 
fact that the condition did not provide facially ascertainable standards for 
                                                                                                                   
to be satirical, and which contained pictures that seemed, in the words of the court, to be “more artistic 
than prurient.”  Id. at 477–79.  The court concluded that Farrell’s as-applied vagueness challenge had no 
merit with respect to Scum, since Farrell, and his parole officers had adequate notice that Scum violated 
the special release condition, and since Scum was so over the line that no reasonable parole officer would 
doubt that Farrell’s possession of Scum violated the condition.  Id. at 494.  
 98. Id. at 497. 
 99. Id. at 490. 
 100. Id. at 485. 
 101. Farrell, 449 F.3d at 485. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 498. 
 104. Id. at 497. 
 105. See, e.g., Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d at 79 (striking down a ban on “pornography of any kind” on 
plain error review);  Kenrick, 241 F. App’x at 16–17 (holding that the prohibition encompassed materials 
that were not reasonably relatable to Kenrick’s offense, and that “sexually explicit” could be more vague 
than “pornography”);  United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that “sexually oriented and sexually stimulating” could be read to define and 
clarify “pornographic”). 
 106. 193 P.3d 678 (Wash. 2008). 
 107. Bahl, 193 P.3d at 687. 
 108. Id. at 686–87. 
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enforcement.109  Finally, the court noted that “sexually explicit,” a phrase 
used in several of the other release conditions at issue in the case, was not 
inherently vague, since the term had been defined in a state statute, and could 
easily be understood in the context of the conditions in which it was found.110 
In summary, courts are likely to strike down special release conditions if 
they find that the language is too broad to be a useful means to the 
government’s stated ends of defendant rehabilitation, deterrence, and public 
protection.  Although the government can sometimes effectively argue that 
broad language is necessary to meet its goals, the language cannot be so 
broad that it can be read to infringe rights that are not reasonably related to 
the defendant’s prior misconduct.  Additionally, courts are hesitant to enforce 
conditions that they feel may not be understandable in practice, such as 
conditions that provide no easily identifiable standards for probation officers 
to interpret them.  Finally, the court’s determination of whether or not to 
uphold a release condition may be influenced by whether the court is asked 
to focus primarily on vagueness or on overbreadth.  Courts that examine 
overbreadth challenges look at the government’s goals and ask whether the 
release condition meets those goals, while courts that focus on vagueness ask 
whether a reasonable person would be able to understand what the condition 
means.  These two different questions may lead to different ways of 
analyzing similar conditions.  Thus, the constitutionality of special release 
conditions may turn at least to some degree on the questions the court is 
tasked with deciding in relation to these conditions. 
 
IV.  ATTEMPTS TO NARROW RELEASE CONDITIONS 
 
What the courts have thus far failed to see is that, for the vast majority of 
probationers, a ban on “pornography” or “sexually stimulating” materials is 
virtually always going to be overbroad.  A presumption underlying the 
imposition of special release conditions prohibiting pornography is that such 
a prohibition will effectively deter the probationer from engaging in future 
criminal conduct.  What is noticeably lacking in most challenges to these 
special release conditions, however, is any argument that these prohibitions 
are not effective deterrent mechanisms.  Can it truly be said, for example, 
that a probationer with a penchant for child pornography will be better served 
by a blanket ban on all pornography as opposed to a ban on just child 
pornography?  Or that a person on probation after being charged with sexual 
assault will be less likely to engage in recidivism if that person is prohibited 
from possessing pornography? 
On the latter question, the evidence linking pornography to sexual assault 
                                                 
 109. Id. at 688. 
 110. Id. at 688–89 (noting that the condition containing the words “sexually explicit” was a ban on 
conduct, rather than on possession. 
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is questionable at best.111  In fact, some evidence even suggests that looking 
at pornography may actually make a person less likely to engage in sexual 
assault.112  Without a link between pornography and sexual assault, special 
release conditions prohibiting pornography seem like they are primarily 
geared toward punishment of the probationer, rather than the fulfillment of 
government goals such as preventing recidivism and promoting public 
welfare.  If there is no prevention or public welfare justification for these 
special release conditions, the argument for infringing on a probationer’s 
First Amendment rights gets substantially weaker. 
In thinking about whether a given special release condition is 
constitutional, courts must keep in mind that the primary purpose of special 
release conditions is not to punish the probationer.  Indeed, probationers have 
already been punished and have already served time for punishment.  Instead, 
the primary purpose of supervised release is to make sure that probationers 
do not relapse and repeat their offending conduct.113  
 
A. The Legal Definitions 
 
Over the years, courts have generated several ideas about where one 
might look in order to clarify the meaning of special release conditions 
involving pornography and sexually oriented expression.  This Section 
provides a brief overview of sources that courts have relied on in evaluating 




                                                 
 111. Some Link Pornography to Sexual Assault, Violence, ONLINE GONZAGA BULLETIN (Apr. 27, 2006), 
http://www.gonzagabulletin.com/article_4adae5ca-eda2-536d-8757-009e1176a828.html (noting that there 
is conflicting evidence linking pornography to sexual assault and describing study in Japan observing rise 
in pornography consumption but decline in sexual crimes); Jensen, Robert, Pornography and Sexual 
Violence, NATIONAL ONLINE RESEARCH CENTER ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (July 2004), 
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/arpornography/arpornography.html (noting a study that high 
pornography use  is not necessarily indicative of high risk for sexual aggression). 
 112. Steve Chapman,  Is Pornography a Catalyst of Sexual Violence?, REASON.COM (Nov. 5, 2007), 
http://reason.com/archives/2007/11/05/is-pornography-a-catalyst-of-s (observing that since the rise of the 
Internet, “violent crime in America has dropped by 58 percent”, rape has dropped by “72 percent,” and 
“sexual assaults have fallen by 68 percent” and concluding that adult fare on the Internet may inoculate 
against sexual assaults; noting that states where Internet access expanded the fastest saw rape decline the 
most, and concluding that pornographic Web sites provide a harmless way for potential predators to 
satisfy sexual urges that play a big role in the incidence of rape). 
 113. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943) (noting that the basic purpose of probation is to 
offer an offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself); “Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised 
Release,” United States Sentencing Commission at 6 (July 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/Supervised_Release/20100722_Supervised_Releas
e.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (noting that supervised release is primarily concerned with facilitating the 
defendant’s reintegration into the community). 
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1. The Child Pornography Statute. 
 
Although there is no legal definition for the term “pornography,” “child 
pornography” is defined in a federal statute.  Codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2256, 
the child pornography statute offers several definitions that courts have 
attempted to apply to release conditions involving pornography.114 
The child pornography statute defines “sexually explicit conduct” as 
“actual . . . (i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-
genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; 
(ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.”115  The 
statute then defines “child pornography” as: 
 
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, 
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, 
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other 
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where . . . the production of 
such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.116   
 
At least two courts have suggested that borrowing language from the 
child pornography statute and reworking it could result in an acceptable 
clarification for special release conditions.117  At the same time, any 
definition of adult “pornography” must be narrow enough to encompass only 
the conduct that the government desires to prohibit, including conduct that 
involves more than visual depictions.   
Yet, the purpose of the child pornography statute is different from the 
purpose of special release conditions.  The child pornography statute is 
aimed at protecting children from harm, and is designed to be used in a broad 
range of contexts; whereas special release conditions in the probation context 
need to be aimed at addressing the effect certain materials have on the 
particular person possessing them.  Thus, taking definitions from the child 
pornography statute, without anything more, could not achieve the desired 
results.   
 
                                                 
 114. Several courts have recently recognized this statute as unconstitutional.  See United States v. 
Stewart, 839 F.Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Lora v. Boland, 825 F.Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ohio 2011); 
Parker v. States, 81 So.3d 451 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 2011). 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(i)–(v) (2008). 
 116. Id. § 2256(8)(A)–(C). 
 117. See Loy, 237 F.3d at 267 (suggesting that borrowing from the child pornography statute would 
provide a sense of legality that is lacking in the “pornography” cases); see also Farrell, 449 F.3d at 486–
88 (noting approvingly of the idea of borrowing from the child pornography statute but suggesting that the 
Ninth Circuit might not accept a modified definition from the child pornography statute). 
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2. State Statutes. 
 
Some state statutes contain definitions of “pornography” or related terms.  
For example, Washington state law provides that promotion of pornography 
occurs when “[a] person [ ], for profit-making purposes and with knowledge, 
sells, exhibits, displays, or produces any lewd matter. . . .”118  “Lewd matter” 
is also defined in the state code as “synonymous with ‘obscene matter,’ 
which is defined generally in accord with the definition of ‘obscenity’ 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California.”119  
Reading these definitions together, it seems that in Washington, 
“pornography” is synonymous with “lewd matter,” which is synonymous 
with “obscene matter.”  Although the Washington statute provides a helpful 
way to think about “pornography,” the Washington Supreme Court recently 
held that “obscenity” and “pornography” could not be equated, and that the 
statute provided an inadequate definition of “pornography,” at least as related 
to special release conditions.120 
The Washington Supreme Court’s decision implicitly rejected yet 
another possibility for defining “sexually oriented materials,” thereby 
reworking the Miller definition of “obscenity.”  In Miller, the Supreme Court 
held that, to determine whether or not something is obscene, the fact finder 
must consider: 
 
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.121   
 
Despite the fact that Miller represents a Supreme Court-articulated 
definition, reworking a definition for obscenity would be of no use because 
“pornography” and “obscenity” are not equivalent.122  Specifically, 
“pornography” is not a legal term of art like “obscenity”; while the Court 
articulated a test for “obscenity,” it explicitly declined to develop a definition 
for “pornography,” even though the case at hand arguably was concerned 
                                                 
 118. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68.140 (West 1985). 
 119. Bahl, 193 P.3d at 687 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48A.010(2) (West 1990)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 122. See Loy, 237 F.3d at 263 (rejecting the adoption of the Miller test because many items that would 
not be patently offensive or obscene might still qualify as pornography); Farrell, 449 F.3d at 489 n. 6 
(differentiating the case at hand from Miller, and noting that the Supreme Court cited the dictionary 
definition of “pornography” in a footnote, illustrating the difficulty of finding a workable definition for the 
term). 
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with both pornography and obscenity.123  Finally, the definition of 
“obscenity” excludes material that has some kind of value.  A value-driven 
definition is not desirable in the context of special release conditions; instead, 
release conditions must be focused on the kinds of materials that create 
dangerous behavior in the probationer.  Thus, while the Miller test may have 
created a legal term of art, the definition would not have been effective in 
curtailing materials that trigger a harmful response in probationers.   
 
3. Court Definitions and Clues From Case Law.   
 
In several instances, courts have implicitly expressed their own 
limitations on the meaning of pornography in dicta, and several courts have 
come up with definitions of their own that have been approved for certain 
situations.  Examples include the definition of what is “obscene for 
children,”124 and the Supreme Court’s reasoning as to how much sexually 
explicit activity is necessary before the material in question is “characterized 
by an emphasis” on sexually explicit material.125  Similarly, other definitions 
that have been developed for use in practice, such as those used in prison 
regulations126 or in Federal Communications Commission regulations.127  
While these examples serve as good starting points for attempting to clarify 
the meaning of release conditions prohibiting sexually oriented materials, 
they fail to take into account the unique situations of individual probationers.  
Even if they do not explicitly endorse a unique definition, several court 
opinions still provide guidance as to what terms courts think should be 
included in a prohibition of sexually oriented expression.  Specifically, courts 
have suggested, in dicta, that the type of materials to be prohibited should be 
designed to cause sexual excitement,128 contain explicit or offensive 
descriptions of sex,129 and have the primary intention of arousing sexual 
appetite.130  Courts have also expressed concern whenever artistic material 
risks falling into a given definition.131   
In short, courts’ attempts to define or narrow terms in special release 
conditions involving pornography miss the mark because even the narrower 
                                                 
 123. Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n. 2. 
 124. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 968 F.2d at 688 (noting that something is obscene for children if it 
meets the Miller criteria for obscenity when examined from the point of view of a minor).   
 125. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976). 
 126. See, e.g., Loy, 237 F.3d at 264 n. 5. 
 127. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 737–40 (1978) (noting that the term 
“indecency” has been defined by the Federal Communications Commission).   
 128. See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 n. 2 (using a dictionary reference to define pornography as “a 
portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement”). 
 129. See, e.g., Farrell, 449 F.3d at 489 (suggesting that there must be “an element of sexual explicitness 
or offensiveness” involved in any definition of “pornography”). 
 130. See, e.g., id. at 490–91 (suggesting that material should be wholly designed to arouse sexual 
appetite). 
 131. See, e.g., Loy, 237 F.3d at 264. 
2013 DEMYSTIFYING “PORNOGRAPHY” 89 
definitions often fail to address the probationer’s specific background, 
problems, and tendencies, and therefore, fail to comply with the 
government’s goals for these special release conditions: rehabilitating the 
probationer and preventing repeat offenses. 
 
B. “Commonsense” Reading 
 
Rather than attempt to define sexually oriented expression, some courts 
have suggested that special release conditions merely be read in a 
“commonsense” manner.  The argument behind this approach is that 
defendants really do know enough to understand what conduct is and is not 
prohibited by the release condition without a definition. Courts charged with 
interpreting the condition can merely use contextual common sense to know 
where the line is drawn.  Of the circuit courts, the Fifth Circuit most strongly 
endorsed a commonsense reading of special release conditions in its decision 
in United States v Phipps.132  The Fifth Circuit did not merely embrace an “I 
know it when I see it” approach, but urged that a release condition be read in 
context with (1) other conditions of supervised release imposed on the same 
defendant, and (2) the circumstances of the defendant’s underlying 
conviction.133  By reading the conditions together, the court was able to read 
limitations into the terms “sexually oriented” and “sexually explicit.” 
In short, by placing the supposedly vague condition in the context of the 
defendant’s overall situation, the Fifth Circuit was able to determine the 
limitations of the prohibition without changing the language of the condition 
itself.  To defend its position, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that reading a 
broader condition in context was more desirable than reading a condition that 
specified each type of prohibited conduct.134  The court stated that listing 
every instance of prohibited conduct in a release condition would be nearly 
impossible and almost certainly counterproductive.135  Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit, by reading the prohibitions in context and using common sense, was 
able to add clarity to otherwise imprecise language. 
In spite of the Fifth Circuit’s endorsement of a “commonsense reading,” 
both the Third and the Ninth Circuits have strongly suggested, in dicta, that 
there is no real way to read prohibitions using common sense alone.  
Specifically, these courts have held that relying on the defendant—or anyone 
else—to “know it when he sees it” is extremely problematic and 
                                                 
 132. 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 133. Id. at 193. 
 134. Id.  This argument is similar to a “roadmap for evasion” argument—the idea that one can avoid 
liability by particularizing one’s actions.  See E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving Review of Underclared 
Programs: A Statutory Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101 YALE L.J. 643, 657 (1991) (describing 
the roadmap for evasion problem in the agency context). 
 135. Id. 
90 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 11, No. 1 
unconstitutional.136  Yet, it is not clear how the courts would react to the 
contextual, holistic commonsense reading approach employed by the Fifth 
Circuit.  Therefore, although the “I know it when I see it” test should be 
unqualifiedly rejected, the idea of an informed, contextual reading ought to 
be retained in a sense by requiring that special release conditions be narrowly 
tailored to address the problems surrounding a particular probationer.   
 
V.  TAILORING SPECIAL RELEASE CONDITIONS 
 
The circuit split indicates the conflict among the courts over how to 
evaluate challenges to special release conditions.  Although some vagueness 
in special release conditions may be helpful in encouraging probationers to 
steer far afield of prohibited materials, special release conditions are too 
often overly vague, resulting in confusion and lawsuits.  In addition, special 
release conditions are often overbroad in that they prohibit materials that are 
not reasonably related to goals of deterrence and rehabilitation.   
The development of a consistent approach to evaluating the types of 
sexually oriented expression that may constitutionally be restricted for 
probationers could help courts to interpret these types of release conditions.  
In light of evidence questioning the link between pornography and sexual 
crimes, it is critical that courts develop and interpret special release 
conditions that are narrowly tailored to address the probationer’s specific 
situation; this is particularly true when those conditions involve 
infringements on First Amendment rights.  
Furthermore, a more uniform approach to addressing special release 
conditions that ban pornography, or sexually stimulating materials, is 
desirable because it will give probationers advance notice of what types of 
release conditions are acceptable in a given situation. 
 
A. Using Tailoring 
 
Rather than putting a blanket ban on “pornography,” or “sexually 
stimulating” materials, courts should tailor special release conditions at the 
outset to prohibit only those subcategories of pornography that relate to the 
probationer’s illegal conduct.  For example, for a probationer that has 
committed a sexual crime, a blanket ban on all “pornography” may be 
inappropriate and even counterproductive, given the tenuous link between 
pornography and sexual crimes.  Instead, prohibiting only pornography that 
features sexual assault may be a more appropriate release condition for this 
particular probationer.  Similarly, for a probationer convicted of possessing 
child pornography, a special release condition prohibiting both simulated and 
                                                 
 136. See Loy, 237 F.3d at 264; see also Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 872. 
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real child pornography may be called for instead of a blanket ban. 
By issuing more narrowly-tailored special release conditions at the 
outset, courts will avoid the trouble of both overbreadth and vagueness.  
Because the condition would directly target the specific type of criminal 
conduct in which the probationer previously engaged, it would arguably be 
more responsive to the goals of preventing recidivism, and protecting the 
public, thereby avoiding an overbreadth challenge.  Similarly, prohibiting 
specific subcategories of a broader category (pornography) would make it 
more difficult for probationers to bring vagueness challenges, because the 
link between their prior conduct and the current release condition would be 
substantially clearer. 
In addition to varying special release conditions based on the type of 
crime committed, courts should also take the number of times a probationer 
has committed a given offense into account.  Repeat offenders should be 
subject to stricter special release conditions.  This is especially true for repeat 
probation violators.  Thus, to the extent that a narrower special release 
condition is not working, courts could broaden the ban to include more forms 
of pornography. 
Requiring special release conditions to be tailored to the specific 
probationer at the outset would make the government’s job easier if it is 
called upon to argue in favor of these special release conditions.  Currently, 
the government must argue that broad release conditions covering all forms 
of “pornography” are, nevertheless, appropriate because they can somehow 
relate back to the individual situation of a particular probationer.  This line of 
argument often requires elaborate justifications and extensive reasoning.  By 
contrast, closer tailoring of these conditions at the outset would make it 
easier for all parties, including courts, probationers, and the government, to 
understand and address how these conditions effectively address the 
problems of a particular probationer. 
Furthermore, enforcement of more narrowly tailored special release 
conditions would not be any more difficult than enforcement of the current 
blanket bans.  Arguably, probation officers would have an easier time 
enforcing such narrow conditions, as they would inherently contain even 
more guidance from courts as to what types of pornography were 
impermissible.   
Special release conditions in the context of other types of violations are 
similarly more narrowly tailored.  For example, probationers with a history 
of weapons violations frequently receive special release conditions 
prohibiting them from purchasing or obtaining firearms or other dangerous 
weapons. 137  Note that this special release condition does not provide a 
                                                 
 137. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, REVIEW OF GUIDELINES FOR REVOCATION OF 
PAROLE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE (March 2009), available at 
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/documents/ReviewofGuidelinesforParole-
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blanket prohibition on all weapons.  For example, Nerf guns, or dull kitchen 
knives, arguably would not fall under this release condition.  In contrast, for 
probationers subject to release conditions banning pornography, all 
pornography is prohibited, regardless of whether it invokes dangerous 
behavior in the probationer. 
The vagueness doctrine evidences the need for more definition in special 
release conditions, while the First Amendment doctrine dictates that any 
restrictions on a defendant’s freedoms must be reasonably related to the 
government’s goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public.  
Although any supervised release condition may inevitably deprive 
defendants of some of their First Amendment freedoms, conditions must 
nevertheless be crafted and interpreted so that they only deprive the liberty 
necessary for the state to meet its goals.  Thus, all supervised release 
conditions should be both narrowly tailored and directly related to address 
the defendant’s specific situation.   
Special release conditions must also be interpreted in context, with the 
defendant’s specific situation in mind.  When issuing a special release 
condition, judges must also think about how the condition will serve to 
address the behavioral problems of the specific defendant at issue.  
Specifically, the court should consider the types of prohibitions the defendant 
has been exposed to in prison, the type of conduct that has been problematic 
for the defendant in the past, and how the conditions, taken as a whole, serve 
to remedy the defendant’s behavior, and guide the defendant’s future 
conduct.  This will help the court tailor the condition to the defendant, 
thereby giving the defendant clearer notice since the defendant should 
reasonably be expected to know what kind of materials or behavior induces 
his own misbehavior or deviant conduct.138  In practice, the probation officer 
should also interpret each condition with the defendant’s deviant behavior in 
mind.139  
The tailored special release condition is neither overly rigid, nor overly 
flexible.  As discussed, the extent to which the condition needs to be tailored 
may vary depending on the probationer.  The First Amendment requires no 
tailoring once a standard is clearly defined.140  Yet, for purposes of avoiding 
                                                                                                                   
ReleaseRevocation2009Report_002.pdf; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE (July 2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/Supervised_Release/20100722_Supervised_Releas
e.pdf (“The defendant shall not possess a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any other dangerous 
weapon.”). 
 138. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112 (holding that an ordinance may give fair notice if it is placed in a 
particular context). 
 139. See Kenrick, 241 F. App’x at 17 (specifying that purpose must be balanced against First 
Amendment concerns). 
 140. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (noting that “where a vague statute ‘abut(s) upon sensitive areas of 
basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms” and that 
“[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”) 
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vagueness challenges to special release conditions, courts issuing the 
conditions would be wise to make sure that the conditions are reasonably 
tailored to address the particular dangerous behavioral problems of each 
defendant.  In particular, courts may want to structure the conditions based 
on the defendant’s sexual preferences.  Courts should pay particular attention 
to whether the material being prohibited appeals to the prurient interest of the 
particular probationer.  By customizing the release condition to the particular 
defendant in a given case, courts will be able to more accurately target the 
materials that cause problems for the probationer, and, therefore, produce a 
more accurate balance of state interests with probationer’s rights.  While 
some courts have implicitly endorsed individualized release conditions, it is 
not something courts evaluating special release conditions have explicitly 
embraced in the past.141  Instead, courts generally either accept or reject 
special release conditions as a whole, without considering whether altering or 
tailoring them may produce beneficial results.  As burdensome as it might be 
to tailor a special release condition to a particular defendant prior to issuing 
the condition, those that are individualized to some extent are necessary to 
ensure that only that speech that triggers the defendant’s problematic 
behavior is prohibited.  Tailoring the special release condition at the outset 
saves time and resources later on by making it less likely that these 
conditions will be litigated for vagueness or overbreadth. 
Arguably, the prohibitions found in special release conditions derive 
some strength on account of their vagueness.  Instituting a bright-line legal 
definition for “pornography,” as some courts and commentators have 
advocated, would give defendants the opportunity to seek out loopholes 
whereby they can obtain material that triggers their deviant behavior yet falls 
outside the scope of the legal definition.142  Yet, adding a baseline 
individualization for use of “pornography” or “sexually oriented” materials 
in the release conditions should strike a better balance in that the condition 
proposed is dependent on the particular behavior of the defendant concerned.   
The approach of a more tailored release condition, augmented by an 
informed, contextual understanding of the defendant, and the charges against 
him/her shifts the bulk of the interpretive responsibility from the probation 
officer to the court.  This shift would help curtail concerns about giving 
probation officers too much discretion.  Of course, the court’s interpretation 
of a release condition would still allow officials some level of discretion in 
the interpretation; however, the restrictions should be less dependent on the 
probation officer’s personal understanding of the terms in the release 
                                                 
 141. See, e.g., Phipps, 319 F.3d at 193–94. 
 142. See, e.g., Farrell, 449 F.3d at 498 (“We hope that greater efforts will be made in the future to 
define adequately the terms of parole conditions dealing with pornographic materials.”); United States v. 
Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2003) (urging courts imposing prohibitions relating to pornography to 
reference the child pornography statute and noting that the term “pornography” is inherently vague when 
not associated with a specific definition). 
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condition, and more dependent on whether, and how the defendant’s 
situation changes over time.  The resulting level of discretion would thus be 
more limited than it would be if the probation officer was faced with a broad 
and undefined term in the release condition.143 
The practice of further tailoring special release conditions also addresses 
many of the concerns courts have expressed about regulating speech 
protected by the First Amendment.  Specifically, as discussed above, courts 
are often hesitant to limit speech that might have some social value.  The 
proposed individualization allays these concerns by penalizing only that 
speech that invokes an offensive or dangerous reaction in the probationer.  
By addressing sexual arousal in a particular defendant, an individualized 
special release condition provides a behavior-driven solution that is more 
targeted to address the probationer’s underlying problems than a generic 
condition.  Because the condition is designed to be tailored specifically to the 
probationer and the circumstances of the case, it will provide a more 
adequate and more accurate balance of state and First Amendment interests 
than a generic legal definition, which runs the same risks of vagueness that 
characterize the word “pornography.”   
Because the special release condition is informed by the individual’s 
particular problem, it allows probation officers to remove the specific 
material that causes the defendant’s problem while still giving the 
probationer access to other materials protected by the First Amendment.  
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the tailoring provides more 
notice to individuals about their prohibited conduct and is tied to a narrow 
prohibition that has less room for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.  
Specifically, tying the release condition to a particular individual helps that 
individual understand what materials he can and cannot possess, while giving 
probation officers a clearer sense of how to treat material that they find in the 
probationer’s home.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article shows how misguided attempts at defining and analyzing 
overly broad special release conditions relating to pornography and sexually 
oriented expression create more problems for courts and probationers.  
Instead of focusing on narrowing an overly broad category by attempting to 
attach a legal definition to it, courts should individualize special release 
conditions so that they are more closely related to the behavior and problems 
of the individual probationer.  In this way, special release conditions 
involving pornography can be more aligned with the purpose of all special 
release conditions:  to prevent recidivism and further the public interest. 
                                                 
 143. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114 (permitting ordinances to allow for confined judgment and 
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The problems inherent in supervised release conditions cannot be solved 
with a rigid definition.  In particular, since each condition concerns an 
individual, the conditions should be tailored so that the defendant’s unique 
behavioral triggers are taken into account.   
Requiring courts to issue special release conditions that address the 
probationer’s specific criminal problems will help courts evaluate challenged 
special release conditions and allow them to avoid most challenges 
altogether.  Tailoring release conditions to individual defendants also 
provides greater assistance to the probation officers who have the duty of 
enforcing these conditions on a day-to-day basis, and will put probationers 
on more effective notice as to what conduct is and is not prohibited for them.  
Because release conditions will comport with probationers’ actual situations, 
in the event a probationer challenges a release condition, courts should not 
struggle with interpreting the scope of the condition. 
